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The Magic of Reality
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Sean Faircloth:
Attack of the Theocrats!
Thank you. :-)
Yep. It's just a pity they don't replicate, otherwise they could swarm all over this place and get themselves heard without my help! ;-)
That's OK. An idea stands by its own merits, not automatically on the qualifications of those who promote it (though it helps to get expert views, of course).
That may be so, but the meme idea posits that something replicates. Not that it endures, or has a beginning, middle, or end, or that it is inherited, or that it is X by Y by Z dimensions. The basic litmus test is; At whatever size, does it, when given the needed materials, make copies of itself spontaneously? This is necessary for it to give rise to natural selection.
The first trouble is that evolution is not a synonym for natural selection. It's important to distinguish the two. Evolution is when, generation after generation, a replicator accruing the occasional error turns into something else. This includes natural selection, but it also includes other processes like genetic drift, where it's pot luck whether a mutant comes to fixation or not. Natural selection is specifically about mutants spreading or replacing each other in a zero sum game to be the last gene standing, the test being by how well their phenotypic differences help or hinder their own spread.
The second trouble is that, even using the looser analogy of evolution, the analogy breaks down when you look for a replicator which has distinct generations and the occasional error. This is crucial to making the analogy work, and to differentiating evolution from basic change. It doesn't matter what speed you calibrate for: once you've identified a generation, you have to compare it with the mutation rate.
You proposed that generations could occur, say, during the process of editing multiple drafts before sending out a book for publishing. Some ideas will make it into the final draft, others will lose out, and some mutually-contradicting ideas will be competing for the same spot.
However, those ideas don't leap from draft to draft all by themselves - they're put there by a person with a brain - and in the brain, the configuration for the idea (say, the network of neurons that represent it) is still the same one. It may change when new signals stimulate it to grow new dendrites that encounter other neurons and make a new net, or if under-use means its existing links weaken, but it's still the same network. It would be like saying a man evolved during his lifetime from baby to adult. Where, exactly, are the distinct generations, and are they identical to each other? There's a big difference between making two copies of X (the second subsequently replacing the first) and the same X enduring all this time.
A better analogy might be to development. A book has a lifespan, from the birth of inspiration to the "death" by being sent off to the publishers, and then the copy rotting away or falling apart on someone's shelf like a corpse. Or it might be to within-lifetime contests or ecological ones, such as a grey squirrel fighting off a red squirrel for an acorn but co-existing with the tree.
It should be noted that writers are just as prone to looking out for cognitive dissonance as much as anyone, but in this case the dissonant feelings have to be built in by genes too, and for the benefit of having a brain capable of spotting contradictions between ideas. The ideas themselves don't create the dissonant feelings - they're a feature that the dissonant mechanism is designed by genes to spot and deal with, as a means of refining mental mechanisms.
Very well. I'll see what you've put.
At this point, I would maintain that to confuse any change with evolution is a mistake, but I've developed this idea above in this same comment of mine, so I won't repeat myself. I'll see what the next bit says.
To claim it maintains its presence, though, is what I think is part of the problem. Ideas do not maintain their presence. Brains collect (or come ready-made with some of the) ideas and fit them in its network. It's true that the ideas themselves have to matter, but that's because the mechanisms themselves are selecting, not the ideas. It would be no different if a beaver was trying to assess which type of wood would best build his dam. The beaver's assessment has to fit the material he's working with, or he could end up trying to fell a Redwood or an iron post. But the thing being selected - say, an already-dead tree - does not send out phenotypes because it is not itself a gene. If beavers were selected to pick iron posts for whatever reason, the iron post would not be a gene or a phenotype with genes in it being selected for.
The same process could be explained by twin mechanisms trying to strike a balance between keeping old and safe ideas and adopting new and unsure ideas. There are advantages and disadvantages to both ends of the spectrum, just as there are advantages and disadvantages of a beaver being more selective and a beaver being more indiscriminate (say, the former gets excellent high quality wood but not enough to build a dam, the latter gets plenty to build a dam easily but then ends up with more low quality wood). This careful balancing act is a lot like Optimal Foraging Theory, and in the context of brains, the thing being optimised is the adoption of mental tools (ideas, or fashions) that may be unsafe but a chance of getting ahead of others, or may be safe but later lead to the conservative being outcompeted by more innovative rivals. The variation between people's attitudes to the old and the new fits nicely with this genetic paradigm.
I think you're identifying here the passing on of ideas to others (inheritance), why they are passed on (the selection procedure), the innovation stage (mutation), and trends of ideas (the population of genes in a gene pool). Could you confirm this?
If so, I'd better address each one, but I will need confirmation so that I'm not going off on a tangent with my next reply.
When we pass on an idea to others (inheritance), it is certain true that, by doing so, we double the idea. This does make it sound like replication, akin to passing on the genes to our offspring. But this meets the same objection as the virus idea - the gene's copy is itself physically passed on, in this case through the gametes and the germ-line. The idea, however, never leaves my head when I tell you about it. The idea that is assembled in your head never physically budded off from mine by meiosis. This is not a trivial point because meiosis is what makes the gene potentially immortal. The very same set of atoms making up the same molecule could literally pass down the line until the end of all life itself.
I hope it helps if I use the following analogy. Suppose an alien wants to make an android on multiple worlds, say because his relatives have settled on them or his business partners have, and they need one each. He has a radio transmitter that can scan his own android's specifications and beam them to a nearby world, but first he has to build this radio transmitter. Having done so, he then has to align the android so that it will be scanned, and then beam the information across space. In some cases, his transmission hits a nebula and is lost. In others, though, partial information gets through (mutation), and in still others all or most of the signal reaches its destination .
At the other end, his relatives or partners receive the instructions and need to make a machine to interpret those instructions. They do so, and find a match - the instructions for rebuilding the android are now available. They build the android, and then build a radio machine to scan the android and send back confirmation (or clarification if the android is only part complete). Now the original alien has to build his own receiver to interpret their question, and he hitches it to the android to see if it matches. He may send another signal to give them the message STOP, and they receive it and confirm that the android is theirs.
It is tempting to say that the android replicated, but in this scenario the "brains" are literally worlds from each other (don't be distracted, by the way, by the aliens having brains of their own), and the android never buds. The aliens take advantage of the common features of each other's technology to build machines that actively copy the android. The aliens are genes building brains, and the radio waves are the means of bridging the gap between brains. If the aliens/genes didn't think the expensive android was a useful tool, they wouldn't have built it in the first place (the basis for the selection procedure). So it comes down to genetic interests.
I'll just add that, on a longer scale, the back and forth between different worlds may well result in androids being modified or tweaked, or with them being combined to make new models that have their own specs. In my own terms, the exchange and continuous rebuilding of ideas can itself lead to errors which are retained because of noise, or with other mechanisms modifying the ideas as a product or byproduct of their own working. In this sense, ideas and androids could look like they were evolving like autonomous robots after programming, or like bacteria in a petri dish, but it would be more accurate to say that they are being mass produced by the population, with one factory making and tweaking one object from available materials put in. The automated factory machinery also beam instructions to alter the machines of others, given the pre-set specifications and ranges.
The illusion of evolution may be helpful for the analogy of talking about the evolution of ideas, but it runs the risk of being misleading, which is why I think it would help to find a new analogy or to acknowledge it as an illusion.
Sorry. I am a bit on the chatty side, but I love talking about ideas and pinning them down. Just tackle it in bite-sized chunks if you're ever passing this way again.
I was hoping that my point would be valid whichever scale we operate at, because it is less an issue of scale and more an issue of identifying the mechanism. It could fulfil the criteria at the scale of whole countries, but in that case, once we've set the scale, we move in with the checklist.
This is something to be optimistic about, yes. But I fear the counter-counterculture that might follow. The history of culture seems at times like one long list of such counter-counter iterations. :-(
That doesn't work either, because it confuses endurance and inheritance with replication. A thing that gets inherited, like a house, property, or ideology, may pass on over multiple generations and may change from an original style that "loses out" to a new style that "takes over", but this is straightforward modification, not by necessity a replication. It is still being changed, not changing under its own steam, and there are no distinct generations of the thing being inherited. Your example with the changing idea of the universe and with Christianity are effectively a series of tools, outside the brain or in it, that get passed on in this way.
No matter how you phrase it - in a meta or straightforward sense - the brains actually holding the information are not being swept away by a living virus of any kind. They are complicit in the plot, and the supposed virus is a puppet. The brain is actively constructing the cultural bits, and it is doing so because the genes that set it up "want" it to do so. Christianity is the complex result of multiple extended phenotypes running on conditional strategies - for instance, "assume that someone is out there beyond your sight", "behave as others do to fit in", and "match your thinking style with theirs to prevent yourself being ostracised by your peers by actually believing what your family and peers tell you". I go into more detail in the second half of my OP.
A more appropriate analogy for "lineages of ideas" would be with ecological niche competitions, arms races, and business contests, not with evolution by natural selection, because if ever there is any contest between ideas, it is always between at least two people fighting over a physical or social resource they want, such as a claim to status, dominance, group or social safety from rival groups or social units, or an external reward like food or access to sexual partners.
The analogy with group selection is helpful here. A group structure rather than a group might get passed on and be used more often and "spread" and so forth, but it is not so much replicating as being inherited like a tool, which is why non-relatives of the group or outsider groups can adopt it, just as they could steal a house or an heirloom spear that belongs to someone else's family. The thing that induces them to do so, however, is their own genetic set-up that actively structures their minds such that they would go after such useful things. To say that the "squirrels" evolve even as the grey ones drive the red ones extinct is still to posit replicator qualities which they simply don't have, to refer to an analogy used against group selection in a similar vein.
Permalink Sat, 21 Jul 2012 15:24:59 UTC | #949760