Comment 231 by Bernard Hurley

You are missing the key point of my argument. I'm not arguing that epiphenomenalism is provably false. I'm not trying to prove that other aspects of mind don't exist. What I'm trying to show is that other aspects of mind might as well not exist, because nothing we say about them has any certain truth value. That epiphenomenalism is a rather silly view, equivalent to deism.

It's not a weak argument or a strong argument: it's a logical deduction.

I am pretty sure that epiphenomenalism can be proven to be wrong, but I'm not up to it!

Another point of my argument which you have neglected, and which is beyond the stultification argument is the conceivability of determining convincing reasons for the beliefs in ephiphenomenalism which are clearly physical. This would remove any reasons for belief in the epiphenomenal.