This site is not maintained. Click here for the new website of Richard Dawkins.

Comments by Jos Gibbons

Go to: Do we need objective morals?

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 24 by Jos Gibbons

The experience of pain is an aspect of 'objective' reality, things hurt even if we dont want them to. But the premises of your statement seems to be that there is no difference between one concrete act and the complex abstraction of a morality qua morality.

I was discussing the two definitions of objectivity you presented, and critiquing the equivocation of them; they were that the answers isn't contingent on consciousness and that it isn't contingent on subjective experiences. And now you're saying it's that it isn't contingent on hopes, which is another "isn't contingent on" criterion again!

Thu, 26 Jul 2012 15:36:50 UTC | #950105

Go to: Do we need objective morals?

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 19 by Jos Gibbons

Comment by tadmjones

objective means independent of consciousness, meaning a thing is what it is regardless of subjective judgements

Are those two quite the same thing? If I shouldn't punch you in the face because it would hurt, while that may not depend on "judgements", it's clearly not independent of your consciousness, because your sensations are key to the case against me punching you.

Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism

Uses the term "objective" differently again.

Wed, 25 Jul 2012 21:11:29 UTC | #950074

Go to: Do we need objective morals?

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 14 by Jos Gibbons


While a "we need God to know ethics" argument (which comes in "and we do, so he's there" and "so we need to believe in Him whether or not He's evidenced" flavours) differs from the "we need God for there to be ("objective", whatever that means) ethics in the first place", the OP takes exception to the first argument not because it seeks to debunk on this one page every "ethics blah blah therefore blah blah God" argument, but because "you guys are inferior; put us in charge!" policy the first version "justifies" is pernicious and the "justification" is, as you yourself concede, terrible. And while the "there is objective ethics - oh yes there is! So there's a god!" argument is technically tangential to the OP question of whether or not we need objective ethics in the first place, I'll reply to it anyway, because I'm fed up with "well-reasoned", "thoughtful" theists proving they are no such thing (no theists are any such thing, since no argument for a god's existence works) pretending, "Well sure, the first version is bull, but the second one isn't!" (like I said, all arguments for a god fail; here I'll just prove this one does).

As I mentioned in my first post here, the Euthyphro dilemma is unanswerable. While me decreeing what is right or wrong doesn't make it so, nor does God decreeing it so; his subjective thoughts aren't somehow magically more objective than anyone else's just because he's omni-everything. (His omniscience is relevant in the "we need him to know stuff that's true anyway" argument you already reject, but not in the "we need him to make it true in the first place" argument I'm addressing here, because if something isn't real to begin with He won't "know" of it.) Either He makes ethics, in which case before He did so there was no ethics and so his choices were arbitrary, so shouldn't bind us later, or He doesn't, in which case we don't get objectivity at all.

Now tell me - what definition of "objective" do you use anyway? My above a, b or c, or some fourth definition?

CleverUsername, please don't bring group selection into this; selection for working well in groups, yes, but that's a matter of what is selected, not which selection mechanism is involved. If you still think group selection is worth defending, you've not read much discussion of it on this site.

Quine, your point about the objective-subjective line being fuzzy is an interesting one. It brings to mind an RE teacher I had 12 years ago. I asked him whether morality was objective or subjective, so he said some morals were one while the rest were the other. It felt like a cop-out, if only because he never said which were which. Maybe he was right. Maybe you're right. I can't see, however, how you could be right on any of the three definitions of objectivity I discussed above. Could you say what definition you do have in mind? It amazes me how few posters here have done so.

Wed, 25 Jul 2012 06:11:47 UTC | #950022

Go to: Do we need objective morals?

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 5 by Jos Gibbons

korben, do any of my three definitions of objectivity fit what you mean by the term? I suspect b does because "immutability" suggests lack of contingency on detail.

Mon, 23 Jul 2012 17:04:50 UTC | #949903

Go to: Do we need objective morals?

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 1 by Jos Gibbons

I'll make a few points.

  1. Gods don't change whether morality is objective or not; their decrees are analogous to mine or yours. And don't let "condoning murder would be contrary to His nature" suffice as an answer to the Euthyphro dilemma; that just shifts the question from "Does He call it bad because it is or vice versa?" to "Would condoning it be contrary to his nature because it's bad or vice versa?"

  2. Whenever "objective" morality is discussed, the meaning of that adjective is key, but it's often not defined. There are at least 3 definitions I've encountered, so it matters which we're discussing. Perhaps posters, especially VeniVidiVici123, could say which if any of these 3 they think is needed & why. (FWIW I think we mustn't have b, for reasons I'll make clear after I've defined b.)
    a. On one definition, anything that's correct or incorrect is objective.
    b, Another definition is more stringent, requiring that what answer is correct isn't contingent on minds' existence or properties. All statements about minds flunk this definition, so clearly it's not identical with a. I would contend ethics has to flunk the second statement, because any valuable ethical insight will be concerned with our decisions' effects on minds. When I say morals are contingent on minds' properties, I mean not that it's whatever we choose to declare it to be; I mean that the reason it would be wrong to punch you in the face is because it would hurt. If I punch a rock, the only one who will be hurt is me.
    c. An even sillier definition is that we have a straightforward algorithm by which to determine answers. As Tarski showed, even truth isn't "objective" in this sense (indeed, even truth about arithmetic isn't).

  3. I said in a previous discussion that there are no arguments for meta-ethical non-realism, only for meta-ethical non-cognitivism. Those were the words I used, but I intended them with a meaning which, I have since learned, isn't "correct" in the sense of being how philosophers define those terms. I had assumed "cognitivism" would derive from "cognitive" and therefore would pertain to knowledge, a concern of neither definition a nor definition b above. In fact, "cognitivism" is defined as a more inclusive theory than "realism", so non-cognitivism is a special case of non-realism. Therefore, I shall take this opportunity to translate my previous thoughts into terminology that won't sow such confusion.
    I contend there are no (with one exception due to Hume I'll discuss below) arguments for "things aren't really morally right or wrong", only for "we can't know right from wrong", and I hereby name these two propositions respectively moral actualism (MA) and moral knowledgism (MK). (MA is named for "actually the case".) Apart from Hume, every "argument for" not-MA I've ever heard was really an argument for non-MK.
    Hume argued that because of the is-ought gap, MA would imply not-MK, and yet apparently MK is true, so MA is false. Considering that the rest of Hume's philosophy consisted of arguing we don't know what we think we do, that he concluded MK holds just because we think we know right from wrong seems rather odd on his part.

  4. I think we need a, & I think a holds, but I'd have to take a long time defending those views, so I won't do so in this first post. As for c, I think that's rather unlikely to hold. (There are some things which pass c's test; as aforementioned, truth doesn't, although whether something is a priori true, a priori false or contingent does, at least in classical propositional logic.)

Mon, 23 Jul 2012 13:19:01 UTC | #949889

Go to: Benefits for young atheists?

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 1 by Jos Gibbons

There should be some voluntary, blatantly admirable activities in which you could provably engage. Actions speak louder than anything else.

Mon, 23 Jul 2012 12:56:24 UTC | #949887

Go to: Anti-Dawkins legislation

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 17 by Jos Gibbons

It is a wind-up, but nowadays we actually need to be told that, which is concerning. That was the point Professor Dawkins made in the OP.

Sat, 21 Jul 2012 11:35:41 UTC | #949747

Go to: Anti-Dawkins legislation

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 15 by Jos Gibbons

Not nearly that blatantly

"In God We Trust", "One Nation Under God" and "National Day of Prayer" seem quite "blatant". And see also that Mencken example above.

Sat, 21 Jul 2012 06:55:22 UTC | #949725

Go to: German politicians pledge to protect religious circumcision

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 21 by Jos Gibbons

Out of curiosity, have you, Jos, assuming that you are male, ever gone bareback? Be honest, now.

Firstly, personal questions are irrelevant here. Secondly, no I haven't. Thirdly, what makes this whole tangent even more pointless for you to have brought up is you'll probably assume I'm lying anyway.

I hope you're not saying that only a preventative measure that is 100% effective should be allowed.

You're the one who responded to the condoms alternative by bringing up the West's nonzero STD incidence. I'm the one who replied by saying neither method is perfect but you ought to look at the actual numbers. I literally can't construe a way you could be stupid enough to think I was the one committing the all-or-nothing fallacy here.

As a circumcised male

Here comes the anecdotes-trumps-data nonsense. It's a well-established fact circumcision is deeply detrimental to sexual sensitivity.

the idea that men should have the option of deciding as an adult on whether to be circumcised is the same as saying that nobody, almost, will get circumcised. No man in his right mind would undergo that procedure which is much more painful and dangerous than it is in infancy. I know that that's what you'd prefer, but it's pretty silly. In the West, either circumcize during infancy or not at all.

And you're the one who's for circumcision? If no-one would take it, it's a bad thing. (And it does sometimes happen, usually because it's either briefly in fashion or a guy's marrying into Judaism.)

You never answered my question as to whether you object to infant circumcision in Africa, sir.

I made it quite clear I was against circumcision being performed at an age when it has no medical relevance yet, or with dangerous methods, or without the patient being old enough to consent, or without a decent medical case for it (which simply doesn't exist to the satisfaction of most of the world's experts). How much clearer does my answer have to be?

You still haven't answered, oh, pretty much anyone else's points.

Fri, 20 Jul 2012 22:13:51 UTC | #949674

Go to: Anti-Dawkins legislation

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 8 by Jos Gibbons

What you forget, Neodarwinian, is that US measures violating the religious neutrality measures in the First Amendment are so common there's no ruling out things happening purely on that sort of grounds.

Fri, 20 Jul 2012 21:09:09 UTC | #949664

Go to: German politicians pledge to protect religious circumcision

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 13 by Jos Gibbons

Ah - that's why there's no HIV and other STD's and cervical cancer in Western countries.

It's lower - that's what's medically relevant. Do you have data to prove circumcision does a better job than condoms? Neither will give 100 % invulnerability. In any case, the problem in the West that prevents levels being even lower is so many people not using condoms.

Are you all also opposed to infant male circumcision in Africa? Be consistent, now, bwana.

Unless you're actually Swahili, a "Sir" will be fine, thank you very much. As it happens I am opposed to the method of circumcision Jews actually use, what with all the herpes it spreads. I am thoroughly consistent; I'm the one who thinks anti-STD measures can wait until someone is anywhere near the age of sexual activity, as opposed to during infancy. Given that circumcision is much more detrimental to sexual pleasure than condoms, it's the kind of thing that should be decided on as an adult. Do you not understand why the medical support for circumcision is so low?

Also, answer every point made by everyone, not just a couple made by me.

Fri, 20 Jul 2012 21:07:01 UTC | #949662

Go to: German politicians pledge to protect religious circumcision

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 7 by Jos Gibbons

As long as Africans use condoms, the "health" argument for circumcision goes out the window as much as does the "health" argument against multiple sex partners in 1 lifetime. So spare us this nonsense. Of course, condoms aren't used much in Africa, because of Catholicism. Yet more religious error in this dangerous area.

Fri, 20 Jul 2012 20:09:24 UTC | #949655

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 124 by Jos Gibbons

It's an utterly pedantic argument......and one in which atheists are every bit as guilty as believers of semantic sleight of hand.

Whoa! Leave people like me out of this. Let Genericguy get the flak!

You see, this is what I've been saying all along - ask of each X whether there's enough evidence for it to justify a belief in it, and don't worry about terms like "supernatural" whose meaning isn't even agreed on. Anywhere who does "believe in the supernatural" has something specific in mind when they say that, so get Xs mentioned so we can have the proper discussion. That's all we need.

Tue, 17 Jul 2012 13:28:17 UTC | #949417

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 104 by Jos Gibbons

Actually, he died last April.

Mon, 16 Jul 2012 18:53:15 UTC | #949337

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 96 by Jos Gibbons

Comment 95

That is exactly why I try to get rid of the word "supernatural" in discussions as soon as possible (see my original post on this thread. If someone rises from the dead, how "weird" is that? "Supernatural" weird? That second formulation doesn't help anything. It would go beyond what we understand of medicine$, to be sure; but you could say many historical scientific findings went beyond what was then understandable, but those aren't "supernatural". It also doesn't matter whether resurrection is "supernatural"; what really matters is which propositions people believe are true and what grounds they have for that. Whether or not it is rational to think Jesus rose from the dead doesn't depend on what labels we would give such a scenario; there's no evidence it happened & plenty of evidence it can't happen, so it probably didn't.

$ Provided we're discussing the sort of rising imputed to Jesus; people can be "clinically dead" for a few minutes but then be pulled back. But of course, we do understand how that process works, which is why we occasionally manage to pull it off.

Mon, 16 Jul 2012 12:44:28 UTC | #949312

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 89 by Jos Gibbons

To hear GL talk, you'd think E=mc² was a discovery we have made but don't yet understand, as opposed to something we successfully predicted in advanced precisely because it is a well-understood corollary of special relativity. You'd also think having something to pray to is important. No it's not. There's no evidence for the things we'd want to pray to existing, so we shouldn't pray at all - case closed.

Mon, 16 Jul 2012 06:46:25 UTC | #949291

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 55 by Jos Gibbons

I'm dropping out of this thread

You promise?
Seriously, can I justify replying if I know in advance I’d be having the last word? Actually I think I can, because otherwise you’ve just discovered the perfect way to have the last word yourself while seeming like you plan to do the exact opposite. So I’ll reply anyway. Having said that, you then add:

If I see a serious reply I might decide to make an exception

which means for all I know you’ll go through a line-by-line response to everyone. So I will reply to you as if you’d never made such “I’m off… but maybe not” comments.

there have been replies from individuals who do not understand what a fallacy of begging the question is even when it is clearly explained to them

I remember you being one of them, me being the one doing the explaining. Informal fallacies differ from formal ones in that, rather than you getting to bin any argument whose structure is such as to “commit” them, you have to explain what’s wrong with their premises (this doesn’t mean you have to disprove them, but only to explain why they ought to be given more justification than is at hand). “Begging the question” is an especially pernicious form of complaint because every deductively valid argument “commits” this “fallacy”, if our offense-detection mechanism is the primitive one you use.

Other contributors do not seem to understand the difference between scientific and metaphysical claims.

The trouble with declaring a statement metaphysical and non-scientific is you need to show it cannot in principle be falsified, and not just make a declaration to that effect. This is why you ought to deal with the examples of Stenger’s I mentioned above. If you want to see the proper way to make a case for a claim being in principle empirically untestable, I suggest you read Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, in which he makes several such arguments. That they are all good arguments isn’t exactly the philosophical consensus, but at least he puts some articulate effort into it.

Some persons that an unsupported assertion is all that is required to support an argument.

You’re the one who responded to my saying assertions should only be accepted if evidence supports them with an argument you claimed proved I was wrong, so you advocate the view at least some claims can be accepted without such support. So how are you not an example of “some persons” such as above? It’s as if you copy-pasted that complaint from a standard bag of argument-winning tricks rather than thinking about what it would say in the context at hand.

There have been other silly claims too numerous to mention

In other words, you won’t prove any silly claims were mentioned at all. You won’t even give one example of such a claim, let alone explain how you know it’s silly. You are looking increasingly guilty of that last complaint above. No wonder you didn’t name offenders.

wild misattributions

Again, apparently no examples. Are they also too numerous to mention? Nothing is too numerous to mention, unless you plan on being unnecessarily exhaustive. (If asked for evidence for evolution, I don’t literally need to recite TGSOE and WEIT in their entirety, because nowhere near all the evidence is needed.)

contributors have resorted to offensive comment when they have been cornered in argument

How do you know they were cornered and that was why they spoke offensively (not that the latter is objective anyway)? Maybe you’re just getting exasperating. Indeed, isn’t the tone of your latest comment an example of such behaviour too?

Sat, 14 Jul 2012 12:48:45 UTC | #949177

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 47 by Jos Gibbons


Firstly, format your quotations properly or it looks very confusing. Secondly, you said you’d only post 1 comment at a time, and then you posted comments 41 and 42. Thirdly, you’re wrong for all the reasons I’m about to say (not to mention what others have said while I was sleeping). Fourth (added after the rest of this post was drafted), if I’m ruder than previously, it’s because you’re dumber than previously. Seriously – you’re on a decline.

Please provide an example.

Why don’t I let the master himself do it? You seem uneager to read his book, so here’s a much shorter list of examples he provides.

science undermines any unevidenced hypothesis even if only some versions of it are falsifiable, because of the epistemic obligations in tow.
Again, please provide an example.

That response proves you didn’t understand what I was saying. One of the principles of science is we should only believe what evidence supports. As long as no evidence supports a claim, I don’t need evidence against it to justify not believing it. If you don’t think such is so, I don’t know what you even think the point of science is.

You could start by looking at a Wikepedia [sic] entry on mathematical Platonism.

I suspected when you first said you expected a philosophical dictionary would prove your point when you blatantly hadn’t looked at one to check first that you like to recommend others do research you yourself haven’t. Now I’m more confident of this than ever. Upon searching Wikipedia for mathematical Platonism, one is redirected to the page Philosophy of Mathematics, which has a subsection on that topic. But “%”, “percent” and “per cent” are all absent from the article, and so it doesn’t say anything about this. If you think Wikipedia does contain this information I invite you to prove it. But what’s the point? Any reputable source will do. But what would be the point even of finding out how popular Platonism is? Make a case for it!

Where do I say that? Please provide an exact quotation. I explained very precisely how your claim was self-undermining without making any such reference.

So you literally don’t understand the structures of your own arguments. Ironic, considering your love of pointing out perceived fallacies in others’ arguments (about which you’re often wrong due to not understanding their subtle definitions). In this case A = my principle about evidence & B – your claim that no evidence supports A.

If you wish to claim that a belief is irrational, you will need to provide a definition of "irrational"

Why? I’m not going to define every English word I ever use in talking to you. You should know what rationality is – you’re posting on! If you were posting on a physics forum, I’d expect you to know what energy is. But then you did only start posting on this site to take the dumb side on this thread. This is yet another reason not to trust your terrible analyses.

What "broader method"? Please outline your method in a concise statement and provide some examples of "irrational" beliefs.

Do you have comprehension difficulties? My method is the one I’ve mentioned repeatedly – if evidence supports it, accept it. You want examples of irrational beliefs? I’d be amazed if you couldn’t list many of them yourself, and it would be very revealing if, upon attempting to do so, something went wrong. Let’s hear your examples, since you seem so confident even supernatural claims don’t qualify as irrational.

Godel, Frege and Plantinga would be just three counterexamples to this

If they’re ghosts. Can you prove these men exist now as ghosts?

Craig has thrashed numerous atheist opponents in debate.He seems to be a very astute logician. Lets not forget that Richard Dawkins has declined to debate with him. Why exactly is that in your opinion?

Firstly, debate doesn’t have the right format to find truth, so Craig’s debating skills don’t make him right. He only “thrashes” opponents by (a) the judgement of his fans and (b) (insofar as he does so) because he has rhetoric skills.
But secondly, to say he “seems to be a very astute logician” proves you don’t know much about logic yourself. For example, he still thinks versions of the ontological argument work, even though that contradicts the fact that “there’s an x such that x equals x”, and hence all statements of the form “there’s an x such that phi(x)”, aren’t tautologies. Then he says such arguments make their conclusions likely, even though as an argument for what is necessarily true its quality is all-or-nothing! And he uses Moore’s open-question argument, which proves he doesn’t understand the difference between attributes and essences. And so on for a depressingly long list of other examples. If you want to gain an encyclopaedic knowledge of them, search YouTube for “William Lane Craig is Not” to look at him proving his incompetence at various disciplines he pretends support his beliefs.
Thirdly, Dawkins made very clear why he wouldn’t debate Craig: because (a) Craig is a creationist and so it would violate a standing policy Dawkins announced years ago to avoid giving them the oxygen of respectability, (b) debates have trouble enough as it is illuminating thought and a guy who makes it his profession automatically ruins it, and (c) at the time the challenge was thrown out Craig had proven himself to be a supporter of genocide and even sharing a stage with him would be disgusting. If you want to know why Dawkins won’t debate William Lane Craig, do you know what you could have done – and therefore clearly didn’t do? Google “Why I won’t debate William Lane Craig” – it’s a well-trodden topic on this very website!

Don’t you do any research?

state the theistic definition of the impossible and contrast it with the atheistic one

Firstly, there are several kinds of impossibility, whether you’re a theist or an atheist. The first is logical impossibility. If you don’t know what that means, please don’t come back until you do. After that, things can be “impossible” in lesser senses – but will they be? On theism, just about nothing will be because God’s omnipotent so could make it happen. A couple of exceptions might be made because “doing that would be contrary to God’s nature”, though in the examples I’ve heard they’re things someone else can and often does do, and which He doesn’t interfere to stop. By contrast, naturalists say that which contradicts physical law is impossible. Some atheists aren’t naturalists, and that’s deplorable of them, just as it is to be that other subspecies of non-naturalist, the theist.

This makes no sense: since the word "God" does not state a proposition how can it be a premise, hidden or otherwise?

It’s like you’re deliberately not understanding shorthand to throw up obstacles. Here the proposition would be “God exists”.

Steve Zara has already thrashed how your comment 42 ends, where you basically ask us to give evidence for the nonexistence of evidence for the existence of God. I don’t have to prove there’s no evidence for something – if you think there is, give it! Are you going to actually give evidence for some supernatural claim, or are you going to do literally anything else, i.e. waste all our time? In fact, God wouldn't even be the most fun one any more - I want proof Frege et al now exist as ghosts; or, less ambitiously, just proof any ghost exist.

Sat, 14 Jul 2012 07:21:28 UTC | #949158

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 33 by Jos Gibbons

science cannot determine whether God exists or not. Why? Because one cannot specify, even in principle, an experiment whereby His existence/non-existence could be determined.

Plenty of hypothetico-deductive analyses have undermined at least some forms of the god hypothesis, & science undermines any unevidenced hypothesis even if only some versions of it are falsifiable, because of the epistemic obligations in tow. I suggest you read Victor Stenger's God: the Failed Hypothesis for some examples.

Many (perhaps even a majority) of mathematicians adhere to such mathematical Platonism.

While I'd be interested to know what the percentage is, what case is there for such a belief? By the way, do you seriously consider numbers supernatural? If so, I think your definition is far from the norm.

I’m not clear what you are saying here, but in any case that does not matter since I have (above) provided a demonstration that your claim that (“that a claim is unevidenced is a reason why to believe it is irrational") is, on your criterion, itself irrational and therefor ought not to be believed.

You claim A&B implies a contradiction, I refute B, you're "not clear" what I'm saying when I do so and declare it doesn't matter because you've "already shown" not-A. Bull. B is wrong; I showed that.

A sound argument (i.e. one which has true premises and is deductively valid) would “warrant” a conclusion; such arguments are truth preserving.

That's a subspecies of evidence. I imagine you won't claim beliefs are only rational if achieved by that method, since you think you've already proven beliefs can be rational even if not achievable from my, broader method. What then is your point here? Also, are you ever going to discuss specifics, or will you continue to simply talk about "the supernatural"?

Fri, 13 Jul 2012 21:23:24 UTC | #949120

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 29 by Jos Gibbons

Please start writing multi-responses as single posts; racking up our post number leads us to start new pages unnecessarily soon, harming navigation.

Science clearly does have limits in the sense that there are matters which it cannot investigate.

Why is that clear? Give an example of something it clearly can't investigate & say why that's clearly so.

This definition

says nothing in spacetime can ever count as supernatural. Which things that don't exist in spacetime do you nonetheless contend exist?

This claim is clearly self-undermining. To see why consider the (your) claim "that a claim is unevidenced is a reason why to believe it is irrational" Now since there is no evidence for this claim on your own account it is irrational and we ought not to believe it!

I wish you'd stop saying "clearly"; it doesn't add to your case, but it does mean your case needs to prove more, since "X is clearly true" is stronger than "X is true".

Anyway, I can give evidence it's irrational to believe that which is unevidenced; by definition evidence for X is a route by which the truth of X leads to its acceptance, so to believe that which is unevidenced is to believe without the belief's truth (if any) being the cause of that belief, which means there's no indication the belief is true. But by definition, a belief is a belief about what is true, making it irrational to have a belief without an indication that it is true. (In this case, the reason that argument counts as evidence for its conclusion is because it is the route by which the conclusion was reached, in which the conclusion's truth led to its being deduced. Thus, sound arguments are by definition evidence for their conclusions.)

Look: are you going to discuss specific examples of supernatural claims you entertain or not? This is the whole point I was making in my first post on this thread; anyone who entertains the supernatural entertains some specific supernatural thing, which they're wrong to do if that specific thing isn't suitably evidenced - so let's jump into that discussion right away. Of course, you've already said you don't accept that evidence is needed to get conclusions. What pray tell would warrant a conclusion?!

Fri, 13 Jul 2012 19:10:13 UTC | #949093

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 20 by Jos Gibbons


None of this is pertinent to my earlier rebuttal since the fallacy of begging the question is an informal fallacy

It’s quite pertinent. Because to complain about an “informal fallacy” is a criticism of the premises rather than the form of the argument, you actually need to explain what is implausible about a premise when you make this complaint. Do you or do you not have an alternative definition of the supernatural in mind?

you are, then, simply making a statement of your lack of personal belief not attempting to present a general argument showing that belief in the supernatural is untenable.

Actually, that’s not true; that a claim is unevidenced is not merely an excuse for not believing it, but a reason why to believe it is irrational, and hence the source of an obligation of all not to believe it.

My point was just that there needs to be an examination of what the supernaturalist presents as evidence for supernaturalism not merely an a priori assertion that “there is no evidence”.

That was not all of your point; you said, “of course, it isn't true that there is "no evidence" for the supernatural”, which means you are saying it is true, in fact “of course” true, that evidence for the supernatural exists. That is going a lot further than it taking hard work to adjudicate on whether something claimed to be such evidence in fact is; it’s to say it actually is. And you can’t get out of this by saying, “well, it is evidence, but the debate concerns whether it’s good evidence”, because “bad evidence” is a contradiction in terms; that which does not give good reason to warrant a conclusion isn’t evidence of it.

I would probably find any definition from a reputable philosophical dictionary acceptable.

Then Google one and copy-paste it here (linking to the source) and show it can’t be used to reach the conclusions for which the present definition was used. DO you even know such a definition? If not, how do you know the one used here is “wrong”?

Come to think of it, what is a reputable philosophical dictionary? (There's little enough consensus on what is reputable philosophy.) Not that there seem many to choose from online, & the ones I just looked at don't even seem to have definitions of the supernatural you could use to "prove" your "point". But if you can track one down I'll be all eyes.

Fri, 13 Jul 2012 06:14:52 UTC | #949035

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 11 by Jos Gibbons

If the definition needed for your a priori argument is provided up front then, indeed, you can manage that. The main thing that strikes me about "the supernatural" as a term is that such a definition is often not forthcoming in these debates. My method is designed to get around this problem automatically. Admittedly if the X they present can be ruled out through logic alone then no discussion of evidence is required. All the same, the advantage of the get-specific approach is they immediately lose the argument, because they jump straight into an example you can't struggle to address, especially since the burden of proof is then on them. And this works even if they don't define "supernatural" in such a way that the contradictions discussed above can be obtained. Such a definition would undo itself through the necessary conditions it contains. Unfortunately, some conceptions of the supernatural have sufficient conditions. "Imagine if you could make an object come into existence by drawing it with special equipment, like Penny Crayon. Well, that's supernatural."

Thu, 12 Jul 2012 21:35:45 UTC | #949003

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 9 by Jos Gibbons

it merely amounts to defining supernaturalism out of existence; it furthermore commits the fallacy of begging the question since it turns out that an argument which is supposed to show that supernaturalism is impossible depends on a premise which rules out supernaturalism from the outset

Arguments of the form "A, therefore B" are not invalidated by A being equivalent to B or, equivalently, by the converse "B, therefore A" being as valid. If you wish to invalidate the argument, either show A doesn't imply B (but you've already conceded it does) or critically assess A. Indeed, tell us: what is your definition of the supernatural? If you won't give one, stick with the one used here.

Jos commits, implicitly, a logical fallacy here, an argumentum ad ignorantiam: there is no evidence for x therefore x is false.

No I don't. "I don't believe X because X is unevidenced" is different from "I know from X being unevidenced that X is false". The burden of proof is on those who believe in the supernatural.

it isn't true that there is "no evidence" for the supernatural, rather one might say that the status of the evidence offered (arguments for religion, Biblical claims etc..) is contentious

Either A is evidence for B or it's not. If there is a contention over whether A is good evidence for B, that doesn't say anything about whether or not it is evidence for B. Whether it is or not is an epistemic matter which, whether or not it is a matter of consensus among human beings, is nonetheless a matter of fact. Now you've never posted on before this thread, so here's an interesting question: what example, if any, of "Supernatural claim X is well-evidenced by Y" do you personally think is true? One will do for discussion. As I said before, I prefer to talk about individual examples rather than assessing "the supernatural" without ever defining it.

Thu, 12 Jul 2012 21:02:22 UTC | #948997

Go to: Refuting supernatural

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 4 by Jos Gibbons

Steve's in-principle point is important because it's only if science couldn't understand something that naturalism is wrong, and it's only because such claims are made that supernaturalism is a load of nonsense. But I think a better way of tackling the issue is like this:

A: Do you believe in the supernatural? B: That term's vague. Let's discuss specific examples to see which, if any, we both believe in. A: Well, what about X? B: No; there's no evidence for X.

You literally don't even need to hesitate there, because the one thing all "supernatural" claims have in common (although this isn't exclusive to them) is that no evidence supports them, so you therefore shouldn't believe in them. This suggests a related approach:

A: Do you believe in the supernatural? B: That term's vague; but, since to believe in the supernatural I'd have to believe in some specific supernatural thing, let's see if you can name a single example of one for which evidence exists. All other beliefs are unwarranted. I won't ask you to prove it counts as supernatural, or to give a definition thereof; but I'm sure whatever example you'd have in mind will be unevidenced.

If they have a decent comeback to that, call a press conference; if not, it'll hopefully shut them up. (We should probably work on my wording though; it's pretty long-winded.)

My point is "supernatural" is a word which, like "faith", stunts thinking about what beliefs are being defended.

Thu, 12 Jul 2012 15:52:27 UTC | #948974

Go to: The Magic of Reality - paperback release June 21

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 11 by Jos Gibbons

I hadn't heard about the 53... error, so I calculated 51!/(13! to the 4) myself, and saw there was accidentally a double-7 in the book's printed figure, increasing it approximately 10-fold. It's also worth bearing in mind that, if your definition of a "deal" doesn't care about which person got each hand, the figure goes down by another factor of 24 to 2,235,197,406,895,366,368,301,560,000.

Sat, 30 Jun 2012 08:13:57 UTC | #948344

Go to: Moral compass: a guide to religious freedom

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 25 by Jos Gibbons

Could you elaborate, Pete H?

Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:31:20 UTC | #948037

Go to: Moral compass: a guide to religious freedom

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 18 by Jos Gibbons

Comment #948009 by nick keighley

It’s clear you’re unwilling to believe the French would want to follow their security-conscious fears to their logical don’t-cover-your-face conclusion, because you just know what was really on their mind. The funny thing is, law doesn’t work that way; the question isn’t whether you harbour at least one bad reason for entertaining a view, but whether you can present at least one good reason for it. Arguments must be dealt with whether or not they are suspected to be pretexts. In this context, incidentally, “good” means in line with the principles on which the state is run, e.g. in line with secularism. That’s why you deem those reasons you don’t dismiss as excuses to be bad ones the excuses are meant to cover up.

who decides what "makes sense"?

See the Baggini points I made; arguments are meant to convince more broadly than within the adherents of a societally contentious metaphysical position.

As for the corporations issues, let’s look at the example you give of:

Britsh [sic] Airways

Who had a policy jewellery not be worn outside of clothing. Seems pretty fair to me. We can argue about whether it’s a good rule, just as we can with French security regulations, but we can’t claim it amounts to religious discrimination, because it has the same verdict regardless of what jewellery depicts.

Sun, 24 Jun 2012 19:20:35 UTC | #948021

Go to: Moral compass: a guide to religious freedom

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 6 by Jos Gibbons

Not every quotation of Malik herein is due to my disagreeing with him, but I often disagree with his analysis, as well as often feeling he doesn’t have the faintest idea what he’s talking about. He often makes very confused comments. He also often overlooks the diversity of conceptions of secularism.

religious freedom

What does that mean? I know what freedom of religion is, and what freedom from religion is. But in my experience, the term “religious freedom” is often used to mean, “the freedom to take away other people’s freedoms for religious reasons”. And no such freedom exists.

Is it legitimate to ban the burqa? Should an employee be allowed to wear a cross at work?

The problem with both of these questions is the phrasing misses the fact that the “bans” were always in specific contexts for purely practical reasons. You can’t wear the burqa if we need to see your face, e.g. on a passport photograph; you can’t wear a cross if that means violating health & safety regulations concerning necklaces. We can argue about whether the underlying concerns are valid, but that’s not how the “debate” is ever framed. Instead religious persecution is alleged by dishonestly avoiding the real context. Given a commitment to health and safety, it is those who want crucifix-laden necklaces to be allowed who are asking for people to be treated differently on a religious basis, as it asks for an exemption.

(France’s burqa ban is a bit thornier because, in addition to their “we need to know who everyone is all the time” ID attitude, which is part of why they consider it worth banning burqas in public, they also hate Islamic oppression of women. But even if that’s not a good enough reason for a public ban, don’t pretend the other reason is religiously discriminating. In other words, there is a secular argument for what France did. We can critique that argument, but we can’t claim it isn’t religiously neutral, although there is a not so neutral argument too.)

guide to the logic of tolerance

I’d prefer a guide to morality. What if sometimes doing the right thing is intolerant? Should we tolerate intolerance, or the intolerant? “Always be tolerant” isn’t trivially a valid answer here.

Should a Catholic adoption agency be allowed to turn away gay prospective parents?

Should a KKK adoption agency be allowed to turn away Black prospective parents? It would go against their beliefs, to be sure; but a secular state expects everyone’s behaviour to fall in line with the same laws, whether or not our beliefs can stomach it. And before you say that religion is different from racism, (i) you have to explain why (they’re both evidentially baseless), and (ii) the KKK had a religious basis for its racism anyway.

Should Christian bed and breakfast owners be allowed to turn away gay customers?

Only if atheist homophobes should be granted the same liberty. Which forms of discrimination are allowed for private companies while not being allowed for the State is a major debate, but we have to keep our stands consistent regardless of what answers we give in that debate.

the competing claims of a commitment to the truth and the facts to personal freedom

Does this mean, “only giving people what they want if their beliefs are correct?” That’s not something I’m on board with.

Many believers point out that faith plays a unique role in their lives. That is often true. Those atheists who dismiss belief in God as no more credible than belief in Santa Claus or in fairies miss the point.

If your beliefs are stupid and important to them, it’s not the person who points out they are stupid who are missing the point; it’s the people who allow themselves to have stupid beliefs on important topics. Racism is stupid and important to groups such as the KKK or the EDL; I’m not the one who’s missing the point if I note that stupidity.

Religion is more than an intellectual exercise

In other words, it matters whether or not we get the right answer, which means we should be told off when we clearly don’t. The importance of religion to people is an argument for, not against, laying into its doctrines’ stupidity.

Modern ideas of freedom and tolerance are usually seen, particularly in the West, as having derived from Locke.

By the tiny minority of people who bother reading old philosophers, yes; but what it means to run society properly is a concern for everyone, and it literally doesn’t matter who invented the arguments the debate uses, but only what the arguments are and how credible they are.

Questions of freedom and tolerance are no longer about how the dominant religious establishment should respond to dissenting religious views, but about the degree to which society should tolerate, and the law permit, speech and activity that might be offensive, hateful, harmful to individuals or undermine national security.

This assessment of how society has changed is overly optimistic. Religions still manage to get illiberal legislation passed even in Western nations, and many nations around the world are going backwards and not forwards in their liberalism because of such religious influence. Further, many criticisms of religion, and demands religion play the same game as the rest of society, are condemned for harm to the religions themselves when individual people are not even argued to be the least bit harmed.

Whatever one’s beliefs, there should be complete freedom to express them, short of inciting violence or other forms of physical harm to others.

It’s easy to say that. But some people’s beliefs are pro-violence in some contexts. Under the recommendation I just quoted, can a Muslim publicly appraise any Koranic verses they like, with the exception of “violent” ones? And this isn’t just an issue for Muslims; it is an issue for people in many religions and in many political movements. In fact, just about everyone wants to see violence in some contexts; full-fledged pacifists are far less numerous than those who on at least one occasion have advocated a war.

Whatever one’s beliefs, secular or religious, there should be freedom to assemble to promote them.

Why doesn’t this have the same “except when advocating violence or harm” exception?

there should be freedom to act upon those beliefs, so long as in so doing one neither physically harms another individual without their consent nor transgresses that individual’s rights in the public sphere. These should be the fundamental principles by which we judge the permissibility of any belief or act, whether religious or secular.

So do Mormons get special access to polygamy under this principle? Others’ negative right not to be harmed is far from the only plausible constraint on one’s permissible behaviour. Again, to be sure, the debate regarding whether polygamy should be legal is nontrivial; but if the quotation above would allow polygamy precisely to those who think they deserve it, I can see there being problems with that being “fair”.

Many atheists want to deny religion the rights accorded to other forms of belief.

I’d like to see some proof of that. Show me an atheist who thinks people should face penalties for publicly saying they think Jesus was resurrected, but not for publicly saying a monster lives in Loch Ness, and I’ll take this accusation seriously. Like all other claims, the claim that both sides are partly wrong needs to be evidence; as with many other claims, this claim’s adherents often forget such evidential responsibilities.

Some atheists argue that secularism requires that religion be kept out of the public sphere. It is an argument that cannot be right any more than the claim that the views of racists, conservatives, communists or gay activists must be kept out of the public sphere.

I think he literally doesn’t know what “the public sphere” means in the context to which that first sentence refers. No-one says religious people should shut up (except, in many cases, rival religions or their members); what is said is that a religious argument for a political policy makes no sense, and should not be treated as if it does, whereas policies should only be passed if an argument which does make sense is offered for them. And this is the sort of concern which makes it invalid to place religion, racism, conservatism, communism and gay activists all on the same pedestal. Gay activists call for equality, and the burden of proof is on those who dispute that. Again, if it can be shown some atheists think religious beliefs should be illegal to bring up in political discussions, I’ll admit it.

It must also be one, however, in which no religion is disadvantaged with respect to another religion, or with respect to secular philosophies and ideologies.

Interestingly, not all secularists agree on this. I once attended in Oxford a talk by Julian Baggini in which he defined secular politics as requiring that cases for policies be based on publicly appreciable facts rather than in-group doctrines; as he put it, public policies must have public reasons. Baggini went on to argue some religions could, in such a state, be treated differently from others, e.g. because some religions represent a public menace. Now Baggini may be wrong about this, but I wish Malik had at least noted that the implications of secularism aren’t as trivially a matter of consensus as he seems to think herein.

Many atheists demand also that religious symbols be banned in the public sphere. Many states and corporations have imposed such bans, from the refusal to allow the wearing of the cross in the workplace to the outlawing of the burqa in public places.

Literally every cited example at the corporate level I’ve ever known turns out, under factual analysis, to be a case of there being some underlying concern with regards to which no discriminatory double standard is being practised. Instead the “persecuted” employees turn out to have been unwilling to be treated just like everyone else. States have violated secular principles often, to be sure; but then, not all states are secular. Of course, France calls itself a “secular” state, as does the United States, but Malik’s conception of secularism and their two are three different ones (at least if our definition of the US “conception” of secularism is the way they behave; you’d think on that basis they don’t even have a First Amendment). Again, Malik’s guide to secularism omits the breadth of conceptions of secularism among its advocates.

The belief that homosexuality is a sin requires that one refrain from gay relationships or gay sex. The belief that life begins at conception requires that one does not have an abortion or help anyone else to do so. And so on.

No it doesn’t; sinners exist, but then they confess or otherwise make amends with their deity. In any case, making others refrain from such things, or denying people rights because they won’t, is another matter altogether.

A racist pub-owner cannot bar black people from his pub, however deep-set his beliefs.

Whenever the gays vs Christian B&B issue comes up, someone claims legally companies can have, for example, no-blacks policies. I bet there’s a lawyer on this forum; could someone who actually knows the law (state in which country, please) say what the situation really is? Of course, Malik may be referring to what should be disallowed in a secular state.

An atheist bar-owner should have no right, whatever his conscience may say, to bar people of faith

Why would his conscience say that anyway? “Only people whose beliefs about metaphysics and eschatology are in line with Big Bang cosmology should buy my alcohol”? No-one thinks like that! Malik forgets that, where religions discriminate against each other, they do so not because they think inaccuracy in beliefs should be punished, but because they think God has placed true believers in a special moral class.

Is it legitimate for a state to ban the burqa? It is not. … Some suggest that burqas cause harm because they may pose security problems, or be incompatible with the needs of particular jobs. Such practical problems can usually be solved on a case-by-case basis without the need for draconian legislation.

Consider again the case of France, which is incredibly security-conscious. This is a society where you need to carry papers at all times, and where you can be trapped where you are if you don’t and there is a perceived security threat. The argument there for not covering faces is religiously neutral (although some adherence for the burqa ban was probably also based on a concern for pernicious effects of Islam, but see above my reference to Baggini’s conception of secularism). When Malik says, you can’t ban the burqa but can make a case-by-case ruling against it, he clearly doesn’t understand that for France the “case-by-case” approach is just not going to work, because they have a universal view on a security issue.

Should an employee be allowed to wear a cross at work? In almost every case the answer should be “Yes”. There may be a pragmatic case for, say, banning loose chains that in certain workplaces may be dangerous

How does Malik know “almost every case” doesn’t have such health and safety issues? What percentage do?

Should a Catholic adoption agency be allowed to turn away gay prospective parents? If the agency receives public funding, or performs a service on behalf of the state, then the answer is “No”… If, however, it is a private agency – if it is simply performing a service for Catholic parents who subscribe to its views on homosexuality – then the answer should be “Yes”. Should Christian bed-and-breakfast owners be allowed to turn away gays? Such owners, even if they are turning their own home into a B&B, are providing a service from which a gay couple could reasonably expect equal treatment. The answer, therefore, is “No”.

Now he’s not even keeping his story straight. Do “don’t discriminate laws” apply as much to private groups as to publicly funded ones or don’t they? How are adoptive agencies unlike hotels?

Should gay marriage be legalised? Yes. … What the state should not do is to force religious bodies to accept or consecrate gay marriage.

Incidentally, this shows how important it is for British secularists that the Church of England lose its primacy not only as a state religion, but also as a religion of the monarchy. After all, if the Church of England doesn’t wish to accept or consecrate gay marriage and the state cannot force them to, and if monarchy marriages need to be within the Church of England, that effectively blocks royals seeking the throne from gay marriage.

many of these conflicts would be better resolved through the pragmatic use of common sense

Apart from the fact that common sense is no more likely to get ethics right than it is to get physics right, religions’ contribution to the debate shows no interest in common sense. It does not persuade the Church of England if common sense is in favour of gay marriage; and, insofar as it has political power, the political process doesn’t give common sense primacy either.

A religious believer should not normally have the legal right to discriminate. But if it is possible to arrange matters so that a believer can act according to conscience without causing harm or discrimination to others, then we should do so.

When would one be able to discriminate without causing discrimination to others? This isn’t a legal question; this is a logical one.

a Christian marriage registrar should expect to have to perform gay civil partnerships… However, it might make pragmatic sense to roster others to perform ceremonies for gay couples, not because we should accept prejudice, but in acknowledgement of the fact that genuine social conflict exists on this issue, and that many oppose gay partnerships or marriages as a matter of conscience and not simply through homophobia… The law should not make such an accommodation. But as individuals, or as organisations, it may be wise to, though not at the cost of causing harm, allowing discrimination or endorsing bigotry.

Why should a registrar expect to have to do what their Church doesn’t? Why should “genuine social conflict” matter more to pragmatists than to the law? Insofar as it should, this is so in any context, not just a religious one; why has Malik missed the umpteenth opportunity to add, “by the way, this is the same as everything else”, as he normally does? All in all, it was a very confusing paragraph.

we should not expect a doctor or a nurse, even in principle, to perform an abortion, if they feel to do so is against their beliefs. Whatever we may think of the belief that life begins at conception, it would be unreasonable in the extreme to expect those who do hold that belief to commit what they consider to be murder.

Malik’s making up these rules as he goes along. Where in the “people should all obey the same rules, whatever their conscience says” rule he gave before does “oh, but not if it’s abortion?” come from? There is no serious thinking happening here.

A pragmatic approach to matters of religious conscience is neither a sign of “weakness” nor a matter of “accommodating” the devil. Standing by political principle is vitally important, including the principle that people should have the right to act upon their conscience if possible.

So, even on the subject of whether you have to keep your ethical story straight, Malik can’t keep his ethical story straight. “People should do as the law tells them, except when not so”, doesn’t tell us anything. Maybe religious doctors needn’t abort. Or maybe religious managers of hotels needn’t allow in gay people. How do you tell which exceptions work and which don’t? Allowing people to act on their conscience “if possible” doesn’t answer this, because it’s always possible to let them, and also always possible not to.

Sun, 24 Jun 2012 09:13:21 UTC | #947992

Go to: The Dark-Matter Ages

Jos Gibbons's Avatar Jump to comment 6 by Jos Gibbons

The Sanford Underground Lab’s main aim: to discover the nature of the mysterious “dark matter” that accounts for almost 90 percent of mass

If you don’t include the 70 % that’s dark energy, anyway (otherwise it drops to about 25 %).

Dark matter is thought to be made up of an exotic, as of yet undefined type of elementary particle

It’s worth clarifying several types of hypothetical elementary particle we already had cause to hypothesise (such as the lightest supersymmetric partner), and even some we already know exist (namely neutrinos), are feasible candidates for dark matter, and so there certainly isn’t a consensus that dark matter is something we’ve never even thought of.

The Large Hadron Collider is the only game in town to answer the key questions that have been driving theoretical speculations, from the origin of mass to a possible GUT of all forces, and even the possible existence of extra dimensions

We think mass is due to the Higgs boson; hopefully the LHC will prove its existence in the next few months. (Disproving it will take longer because at first we’ll only prove a 1-Higgs model doesn’t work. In any case, supersymmetric physics needs at least five of them.) Also, it’s normal to hear GUT and TOE used to refer to theories of all non-gravitational forces and all forces respectively.

the Superconducting SuperCollider, a device far larger and more ambitious than the LHC

Indeed; its top proton energy would have been 20 TeV, rather than 7 TeV. That difference would have been crucial.

Current budget woes only make it more likely that we’ll see even less federal support for fundamental science in the next decade—and raising taxes to support big science probably isn’t going to be viewed as a vote-getter in the current presidential race.

Though I share Krauss’s concerns lay Americans may be impossible to persuade of the merit of greater science funding, there is an argument – whether or not it would persuade enough voters – for funding more science that, rather than being antithetical to economic goals, is rooted in them; research shows science research is an especially good investment to grow the economy, e.g. each dollar invested in NASA has returned $8. I heard that from Neil deGrasse Tyson, anyway. He also claims science funding is greater under Republican presidents than under Democrat ones; if that’s true I wonder, should Krauss be rooting for Romney to defeat Obama in November? (In the last few weeks Intrade’s estimate of Obama’s probability of re-election has fallen from 0.57 to 0.53.)

From a purely intellectual perspective and in terms of human progress, perhaps it doesn’t matter where discoveries are made. But… we risk losing both the intellectual and practical benefits that come with remaining a world leader in forefront science throughout this century.

No perhaps about it; unless it can be shown research does Americans much more good than it does Europeans, that both regions are economically well-developed suggests the world will be as healthy one way as the other. It’s the future of research in the developing world that intrigues me.

Fri, 15 Jun 2012 12:43:33 UTC | #947560